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The Label "Political Propaganda":
Content-Neutral or Semantically
Slanted? An Examination of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act
as Applied in Meese v. Keene
I. INTRODUCTION
Barry Keene wanted to show three film documentaries dealing
with the subjects of nuclear war and acid rain as a means of communi-
cating his own ideas on the subjects concerned. He wished to exhibit
these films purely for the purpose of providing information and not
advocation. The problem was that these three films happened to be
made in Canada and Barry Keene happened to be the majority leader
of the California state senate. The Foreign Agents Registration Act
requires certain foreign films to carry the label "political propa-
ganda." For obvious political reasons, Keene did not want to be pub-
licly regarded as a disseminator of "political propaganda." Yet, his
alternative was to not show the films. Keene brought suit, challeng-
ing the statutory requirements that certain foreign films must carry
this label.
This Note begins by outlining the history of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act and the policies behind it. After a brief statement of
the case, the opinion of the district court is discussed. The Note then
proceeds to analyze the reasoning of the Supreme Court's majority
decision. Finally, this Note concludes by illustrating why the dis-
sent's characterization of the word "propaganda" in both its denota-
tion and connotation is more accurate than the majority's, and how
the majority erred when it evaluated the public's perception of this
word and its possible adverse impact upon materials so labeled. The
majority's statement, that the term "propaganda" as defined in the
Act has no pejorative connotation, is simply put, not in touch with
public perception.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
In 1938 Congress enacted the Foreign Agents Registration Act'
1. The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938). For addi-
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("FARA" or "the Act"). The Act required all agents of foreign prin-
cipals2 to register 3 with the Secretary of State. Further, the Act re-
quired that all persons registered as agents of foreign principals who
disseminate propaganda in the United States must label such material
"political propaganda."' 4 The underlying reason for this legislation
grew out of mounting concern over the activities of foreign advocates,
particularly Nazis, fascists, and communists.5 The Act was designed
to provide for official and public surveillance of these foreigners'
activities.
6
Four years later, with the United States engaged in World War
II, Congress amended and significantly extended the original Act.
7
The amendment expressly declared the policy and purpose of the Act
to be the protection of the "national defense, internal security, and
foreign relations of the United States."'8 In fact, "few foreign agents
had [been] registered, and few who failed to register under the original
act had been prosecuted." 9 Essentially, the 1942 amendment was "an
attempt to facilitate more effective enforcement of [the Act's]
provisions."' 0
Most importantly, the revised Act contained a detailed definition
of the term "political propaganda,"" which has since remained un-
changed. t 2 Also, the amendment authorized the United States Attor-
tional information regarding the history and purpose of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
see 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3218; Pub. L. No. 89-486; 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2397; Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid Comm., 346 F. Supp.
1384 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Peace Information Center, 97 F.
Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951).
2. The Act defines "foreign principal" to include the government or political party of a
foreign country, a person domiciled abroad, or any foreign business, partnership, association,
corporation, or political organization. 22 U.S.C. § 611(b) (1982).
3. 22 U.S.C. § 612(a) (1982) describes the registration statement and its contents. The
Act exempts certain categories Qf "agents" from registration, for example, diplomatic and con-
sular officers. Id. § 613. In addition, the Attorney General may provide for exemptions pursu-
ant to 22 U.S.C. § 612(f).
4. Id. § 614.
5. H.R. REP. No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1935).
6. Id.
7. The Foreign Agents Registration Act, ch. 263, 56 Stat. 248 (1942) (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1982)). See H.R. REP. No. 1547, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1941).
8. FARA, 22 U.S.C. § 611, at 161 (1982).
9. Comment, Neutral Propaganda: Three Films "Made in Canada" and the Foreign
Agents Registration Act, 7 COMM./ENT. L.J. 435, 440 (1985).
10. Id.
11. See infra note 33.
12. Id.
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ney General to label foreign communicative materials, including
films, as "political propaganda."' 3 Other amendments provided for
the enforcement of the Act.'
4
The Foreign Agents Registration Act was again amended in
1966, shifting the focus of the Act.15 "The original target of foreign
agent legislation-the subversive agent and propagandist of pre-
World War II days-has been covered by subsequent legislation, no-
tably the Smith Act." 16 As a result, "[t]he place of the old foreign
agent has been taken by the lawyer-lobbyist and public relations coun-
sel whose object is not to subvert or overthrow the U.S. Government,
but to influence its policies to the satisfaction of his particular cli-
ent." 7 The 1966 amendment made the Act applicable to "persons"
acting for or in the interests of foreign principals' 8 whose activities are
"political in nature or border on the political."' 19 The definition of
"political propaganda," put forth in the 1942 amendment, however,
remained unchanged despite this shift in purpose and focus.
Recently, FARA's registration requirements 20 have been upheld
on the ground that the Act protects national security interests. 2' Yet,
neither the disclosure requirements 22 nor the section 611(j) definition
of "political propaganda" 23 had previously been judicially tested
before Keene. In 1943, the Act's registration requirement was chal-
lenged unsuccessfully in Viereck v. United States.24 The Court in
Viereck stated that FARA's requirements do not chill first amend-
ment rights. 25 The Act, they said:
13. 22 U.S.C. § 614 (1982).
14. 22 U.S.C § 618(a) (1982) provides that "[a]ny person who (1) willfully violates any
provision of this subchapter or any regulation thereunder... shall, upon conviction thereof be
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years,
or both ..... Id. Section 618(c) permits the deportation of any alien convicted of violating
this act subject to the rules for deportation in §§ 1251-1253 of Title 8. Id. § 618(c).
15. Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (1966). The 1966 amendments were intended to
"strengthen the basic purposes of the original act." H.R. REP. No. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2397, 2398.
16. FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT AMENDMENTS, S. REP. No. 143, 89th Cong.
1st Sess. 4 (1965).
17. Id.
18. Id. at I.
19. Id.
20. See supra note 3.
21. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
22. 22 U.S.C. § 614 (1982).
23. Id. § 611().
24. 318 U.S. 236, 247 (1943).
25. Id. at 251.
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[r]est[s] on the fundamental constitutional principle that our peo-
ple, adequately informed, may be trusted to distinguish between
the true and the false, [and that this] bill is intended to label infor-
mation of foreign origin so that our hearers and readers may not be
deceived by the belief that the information comes from a disinter-
ested source. Such legislation implements rather than detracts
from the prized freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.
26
Later, during the 1950's and early 1960's, the United States Post
Office relied on FARA's expansive definition of "political propa-
ganda" to justify its confiscation of huge amounts of foreign mail
under the Espionage Act of 1917.27 Using FARA section 611(j) as a
guideline, all mail from Communist countries was routed to a regional
screening office. If Customs authorities determined the piece of mail
to be "communist political propaganda," the mail vas held and the
addressee notified. Before the mail could be delivered, the addressee
was required to fill out a postcard indicating whether he or she wished
to receive the material and/or any similar material in the future. 28 In
1965, this policy was declared unconstitutional in Lamont v. Postmas-
ter General.29 The Lamont Court, however, did not reach the issue of
the constitutionality of section 611(j). The Court invalidated the Post
Office policy on first amendment grounds, finding that requiring ad-
dressees to inform postal authorities that they wished to receive im-
pounded mail unjustifiably limited their freedom of speech.
30
Twenty-two years after Lamont, Senator Barry Keene sought to ex-
hibit three Canadian films that were considered political propaganda,
thus reopening the issue of the constitutionality of FARA's labeling
requirements.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 193831 empowers the
United States Attorney General to label foreign communicative
materials, including films, as "political propaganda. ' 32 The Act in-
cludes within its definition of "political propaganda" 33 any communi-
26. Id.
27. See Schwartz and Paul, Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails: A Report on
Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 107 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 621, 624-25 (1959).
28. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 303 (1965).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 307
31. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-622 (1982).
32. Id. § 614(b).
33. The statutory definition of "Political Propaganda" is:
[Vol. 11:399402
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cation intended to influence the foreign policies of the United States.
The Act further requires that such material be subject to certain regis-
tration, filing, and disclosure requirements.3 4  Once the Attorney
General makes such a determination, the material must carry a label
which identifies it as political propaganda. 35
In the fall of 1982, the Justice Department reviewed the three
Canadian films that Barry Keene wanted to exhibit and determined
that they constituted "political propaganda" within the meaning of
FARA. 36 The Justice Department then informed the National Film
Board of Canada that these films would have to carry labels identify-
ing them as "political propaganda. '37 In March of 1983, State Sena-
tor Keene filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California, challenging the constitutionality of the labeling
and reporting requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. 38
Keene alleged that the "political propaganda" label deterred him
from showing the films and that the labeling requirement constituted
an abridgement of his first amendment right to freedom of speech. 39
After finding that Keene, as an exhibitor of the films, had stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act,4° the district court held that Keene was entitled to a
[A]ny oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communication or expression
by any person (1) which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating
the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert,
induce, or in any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within
the United States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or rela-
tions of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with refer-
ence to the foreign policies of the United States or promote in the United States
racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which advocates, advises, instigates, or
promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or other conflict
involving the use of force or violence in any other American republic or the over-
throw of any government or political subdivision of any other American republic by
any means involving the use of force or violence.
22 U.S.C. § 6110) (1982).
34. See supra note 3.
35. 22 U.S.C. § 614(b) (1982). Specifically, the Act provides, "The Attorney General ...
may by regulation prescribe the language or languages and the manner and form in which such
statement shall be made and require the inclusion of such other information contained in the
registration statement identifying such agent of a foreign principal and such political propa-
ganda and its sources as may be appropriate." Id.
36. See Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1307 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335
(1986).
37. Id. at 1307.
38. Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1519. The district court held that Keene had standing because (1) the statute
impinges his ability to communicate as a film exhibitor constituting an injury different in kind
from that suffered by the public in general; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendants
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preliminary injunction enjoining the labeling of these films as political
propaganda.4 ' Less than a week later, the same district court granted
Keene's request for a permanent injunction against the application of
FARA to the three films. 42 Upon statutory appeal by the Attorney
General, the case went directly to the United States Supreme Court.
43
Writing for a 5-3 majority, Justice Stevens first discussed the
standing issue. 4 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court deci-
sion in part by agreeing that Keene had standing to challenge the
Act's use of the term "political propaganda" as violative of the first
amendment. 45 The Court reasoned: (a) Senator Keene had alleged a
cognizable injury;46 (b) the risk of his injury could fairly be traced to
FARA's labelling requirement;47 and (c) enjoining the application
"political propaganda" label to these films would partially redress the
threatened injury.48 Since Keene had standing to bring the claim, the
Supreme Court went on to address the constitutionality of FARA's
labeling requirements.
49
The Supreme Court articulated the following reasons for revers-
ing the district court's decision as to the labeling requirements and
upholding the constitutionality of FARA:
(1) the Act's use of the words "political propaganda" does not
abridge freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment
since:
(a) the Act does not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribu-
tion of the materials subject to its provisions, but merely requires
the disseminators of such materials to make certain disclosures to
the public;
(b) there was no evidence that the public's perceptions about
since it is the defendants' enforcement of the statute which is handicapping plaintiff's ability to
communicate his ideas; and (3) the injury is susceptible to judicial remedy, namely the re-
quested injunction. Id. at 1517-1518.
41. Id. at 1523.
42. Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd, 481 U.S. 465
(1987).
43. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987). 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982) provides, "[a]ny party
may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of
any court of the United States ... holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil
action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or
employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party." Id.
44. Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration of the case.
45. Meese, 481 U.S. at 472-74.
46. Id. at 473.
47. Id. at 473-74.
48. Id. at 476.
49. Id. at 477.
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the word "propaganda" actually had any adverse impact on the
distribution of those materials subject to the statutory scheme; and
(2) the use of the term "propaganda" in the Act has no pejorative
connotation, and the term as defined in the Act includes materials
that are accurate and deserving of attention and respect. 50
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented in part,
maintaining that the Foreign Agents Registration Act's designation of
"political propaganda" violates the first amendment, since it burdens
political discourse without serving any government interest .5 The
dissent agreed that Keene had standing to challenge the constitution-
ality of the Act.
5 2
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REASONING
Barry Keene sought to exhibit three films from Canada entitled:
If You Love This Planet, Acid Rain: Requiem or Recovery, and Acid
From Heaven.53 The first film discussed the devastating effects of nu-
clear holocaust on earth and society, while the latter two films address
the problem of the acidification of atmospheric precipitation by expo-
sure to sulfur dioxide in the air, commonly known as acid rain. 54
Keene alleged that he was "deterred from exhibiting the films by a
statutory characterization of the films as 'political propaganda. " '55
In short, the gravamen of Keene's asserted injury was that "if he were
to exhibit these films while they bore such characterization, his per-
sonal, political, and professional reputation would suffer and his abil-
ity to obtain re-election and to practice his profession would be
impaired. 56
At trial, the government argued that FARA's definition of the
term "political propaganda" was neutral and without any pejorative
or denigrating connotation. 57 In contrast, Keene presented expert tes-
50. Id.
51. Id. at 495.
52. Id. at 485.
53. Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (E.D. Cal. 1983). The films are documenta-
ries about environmental pollution and potential nuclear holocaust. If You Love This Planet
was awarded an Academy Award as Best Short Documentary of 1982. Washington Post col-
umnist Mary McGrory said of Acid Rain: Requiem or Recovery that "[a] more tactful, neutral,
inoffensive presentation of a fearful problem that is being visited on one country (theirs) by
another country (ours) cannot be imagined." McGrory, Justice Department's Boos Make Film
Subjects Boffo Box Office, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 1983, at A3, col. 5.
54. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1515.
55. Id. See also supra note 33.
56. Keene, 569 F. Supp. at 1515.
57. Id. at 1520.
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timony to establish the common meaning of "propaganda. '5 8 Profes-
sor Leonard Doob, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Yale
University, testified that the government's designation of the films as
"political propaganda" was pejorative and denigrating to the mate-
rial. 59 Further, Edwin Newman, head of the Usage Panel of the
American Heritage Dictionary, 6° declared that calling something
"propaganda" was tantamount to saying it was not worth considering
and that such communication was put forward in an attempt to
mislead.
61
The district court found Keene's production of expert testimony
persuasive, stating that the phrase "political propaganda," as officials
of the Justice Department applied it, abridged freedom of speech.
62
The court defined "political propaganda" as half-truths, distortions,
and omissions. 63 They proposed that "to characterize political ideas
as 'propaganda' is to denigrate those ideas." 64
The lower court also looked to the legislative history of the For-
eign Agents Registration Act.65 The court tentatively concluded that
Congress intended to denigrate the labeled materials by using the
term "political propaganda. '66 In a later related case on motion to
alter the judgment, the same court found that this term was not only
"semantically slanted, '67 but also that it had already acquired its "un-
savory connotation" when Congress enacted the Foreign Agents Re-
gistration Act in 1938.68 Further, the court also concluded that
Congress had enacted portions of the Act "in order to suppress or
restrict that which it found abhorrent. ' 69 According to the district
court, Congress understood and intended the label "political propa-
ganda" as a term of opprobrium by which it intended to discourage or
58. Note, The "Political Propaganda" Label Under FARA: Abridgement of Free Speech or
Legitimate Regulation?, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 591, 618-19 (1987) (citing Brief for Appellee at
23, Keene v. Meese, 106 S. Ct. 1632 (1986) (No. 85-1180)).
59. Id. at 619.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1520 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1521.
66. Id.
67. Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd 481 U.S. 465 (1987)
(quoting W & M. MORRIS, HARPER DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY USAGE 501 (1975)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1124.
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suppress speech. 70
The court held that a first amendment abridgment occurs when-
ever there is suppression or a substantial interference with speech.
71
Consequently, the court noted that the stigmatization that results
from labeling the three films rendered them unavailable to Keene as
vehicles for communicating his own views on the matter and thereby
abridged his first amendment right to freedom of speech. 72 The dis-
trict court then went on to declare sections 611(j) and 614(a),(b) and
(c) of FARA unconstitutional as violations of the first amendment
and severable from the remainder of the Act.73 The court enjoined
the Attorney General from imposing the requirements of these sec-
tions on the three films. 74 The Justice Department then took the case
on direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to sec-
tion 1252 of title 28 of the United States Code, which allows direct
appeals from decisions invalidating Acts of Congress.
75
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, began his analysis of the
first amendment issue by distinguishing between two different mean-
ings of the term "political propaganda. ' 76 The first meaning, attrib-
uted to "popular parlance,"' 77 suggests that people assume
" 'propaganda' is a form of slanted, misleading speech that does not
merit serious attention. 7 Such speech "proceeds from a concern for
advancing the narrow interests of the speaker rather than from a de-
votion to the truth."' 79 The Court acknowledged that the term "polit-
ical propaganda" as defined in the Act 80 includes "misleading
advocacy of this kind."'8' The second meaning the court ascribed to
the term "political propaganda" involves advocacy materials that are
''completely accurate and merit the closest attention and the highest
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1123-24.
73. Id. at 1128.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 43.
76. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 477 (1987).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1982).
81. Meese, 481 U.S. at 477.
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respect."'8 2 The majority cited standard reference works in support of
both definitions.
83
The majority opinion discredited the district court's reasoning
and claimed that the district court did not look to the statute's actual
requirements but rather relied on a possible misunderstanding by the
public of the statutory scheme of the Act. The Supreme Court as-
sumed that the district court used only the first definition above of
propaganda to reach its conclusion.8 4 The whole line of reasoning
advanced by the district court regarding the connotation and public
perception of the term "political propaganda" was thus rejected in
summary fashion by the Supreme Court as unpersuasive and
misconstrued.
The Court stated that unlike other cases where the Supreme
Court has invalidated statutes as interfering with a party's first
amendment rights,8 5 the statute here "does not pose any obstacle to
[Keene's] access to the material he wish[ed] to exhibit. Congress did
not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials in
an ostensible effort to protect the public from conversion, confusion,
or deceit."'8 6 Rather, the Court noted, "Congress simply required the
disseminators of such material to make additional disclosures that
would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the
propaganda."8 7
The Court further added that FARA does not stop Keene from
explaining to his audience that the films they are about to view have
not been officially censured.88 FARA allows the "[d]isseminators of
propaganda [to go] beyond the disclosures required by statute and
82. Id.
83. Id. at 478.
84. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 942 (1983) ("ideas,
facts, or allegations spread deliberately to further one's cause or to damage an opposing
cause"); FUNK AND WAGNALLS STANDARD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1080 (1973) ("now often
used in a disparaging sense, as of a body of distortions and half-truths").
85. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1964) (statute permitting detention
of mail considered communist political propaganda violates addressee's exercise of first amend-
ment rights); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (criminal statute providing punishment
for mere private possession of obscene material is unconstitutional); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S.
410 (197 1) (statute permitting detention of allegedly obscene mail was unconstitutional censor-
ship); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (statute banning pharmacists from advertising prices of prescription drugs violates con-
sumers rights to free speech).
86. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 480-81.
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add any further information they think germane to the public's view-
ing of the materials. ' 89 Thus, the Court concluded that Keene may
temper any prejudice arising from the label "political propaganda" by
explaining to the viewers that "Canada's interest in the consequences
of nuclear war and acid rain do not necessarily undermine the integ-
rity or the persuasiveness of its advocacy." 90
The Court took this line of reasoning one step further by sug-
gesting that it is ironic that it is the district court's injunction that
withholds information from the public.9' The suppressed information
is that these films fall within the category of materials that Congress
has determined to be "political propaganda."
The Court cited Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.92 where it held:
[t]hat people will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to
open the channels of communication rather than to close them. It
is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers from its misuse if it is freely available,
that the First Amendment makes for US.
9 3
The contention that the public cannot receive too much informa-
tion is the point here. Whereas the district court assumed the labeling
would inhibit freedom of speech, the Supreme Court advocates letting
the public know that the films have been designated "political propa-
ganda" and then allow them to make their own informed decision.
94
The Court also invoked a historical analysis to support its hold-
ing. The statutory definition of "political propaganda" has remained
the same for over four decades. The Court noted, "[w]e should pre-
sume that the people who have a sufficient understanding of the law
to know that the term 'political propaganda' is used to describe the
regulated category also know that the definition is a broad, neutral
one rather than a pejorative one."' 95 Relying on this long history, the
Court deduced "that if the fear of misunderstanding had actually in-
terfered with the exhibition of a significant number of foreign-made
89. Id. at 481. 22 U.S.C. § 612(a) (1982) sets forth the required contents for the registra-
tion statement. This section does not preclude the inclusion of additional information.
90. Meese, 481 U.S. at 482.
91. Id.
92. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
93. Id. at 770.
94. Meese, 481 U.S. at 483.
95. Id.
1989] 409
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films, that effect would be disclosed in the record. ' 96 The Court ac-
knowledged that, "[a]lthough the unrebutted predictions about the
potentially adverse consequences of exhibiting these films are suffi-
cient to support [Keene's] standing, they fall far short of proving that
the public's perceptions about the word "propaganda" have actually
had any adverse impact on the distribution of foreign advocacy mater-
ials subject to the statutory scheme."'97 In other words, as the collo-
quialism suggests, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it."
The majority finally relied on considerations of comity. The
Court paid homage to the deference they normally owe to the legisla-
ture's power to define the terms that it uses in legislation.98 The
Court characterized this particular choice of language by the legisla-
ture as one that no constitutional provision prohibits the Congress
from making. 99 The Court rejected the district court's assertions that
Congress used the term "political propaganda" in an improper man-
ner or that the term has a pejorative connotation.I°° The Court stated
that "[a]s judges it is our duty to construe legislation as it is written,
not as it might be read as a layman, or as it might be understood by
someone who has not even read it." 1°i The Court maintained that
"[i]f the term 'political propaganda' is construed consistently with the
neutral definition contained in the text of the statute itself, [then any]
constitutional concerns voiced by the district court [would] com-
pletely disappear."' 0 2
VI. ANALYSIS
The crux of the majority opinion is that the term "political prop-
aganda" is content neutral and without negative connotation. 0 3 This
opinion fails to be persuasive for three reasons: 1) The Court reached
its conclusion by limiting its examination to the statutory definition of
"political propaganda" and dismissed the realities of public reaction
to the term; 2) The Court concluded that FARA does not amount to
a direct restriction of free speech, but failed to recognize that indirect
96. Id. at 483-84.
97. Id. at 484.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 479-80.
101. Id. at 484-85. See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979). The Court
remarked that "[i]t is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated
meanings of that term." (citing Colautti, 439 U.S. at 392).
102. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 482, 485 (1987).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
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discouragements are fully capable of a coercive effect on speech; and
3) The Court failed to explore alternative possibilities that might
achieve the same results without the damaging effects of the term
"political propaganda."
A. Public Reaction to the Term "Political Propaganda"
The Court limited its examination of "propaganda" to the statu-
tory definition even though Senator Keene never argued that his
speech was deterred by this statutory definition. He argued instead
that his speech was deterred by the common perception that material
classified as political propaganda is unreliable and not to be trusted. 104
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun maintained that the majority
has asked and answered the wrong question. 05 The dissent noted
that "[e]ven if the statutory definition is neutral, it is the common
understanding of the Government's action that determines the effect
on discourse protected by the First Amendment."' 0 6 Blackmun then
addressed what he considered to be the correct question, the common
reaction to the term "propaganda." Citing the same experts the dis-
trict court relied upon, 10 7 the dissent concluded that designating
something "propaganda" denigrates the material. 0 8
The dissent next looked to precedent to support their proposition
that the majority should have inquired beyond merely the statutory
definition of the word "propaganda."'' 0 9 For example, in FEC v. Mas-
sachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 0 the Supreme Court looked beyond
the statutory definition to find a first amendment violation. That case
involved a nonprofit, nonstock corporation, formed to promote "pro-
life" causes. The corporation financed a newsletter urging readers to
vote "pro-life" in an upcoming primary election. The newsletter car-
ried pictures and profiles of the candidates, including their position on
"pro-life" issues, but disclaimed any endorsement of particular candi-
dates. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) tried to prohibit the
publication of this newsletter by invoking the Federal Election Cam-
104. Meese, 481 U.S. at 490 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 489.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 490. See also text accompanying supra notes 58-60.
108. Meese, 481 U.S. at 490.
109. The Court cited, for example, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 402 (1950); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Gibson v. Florida Legis-
lative Investigation Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 100 (1982).
110. 479 U.S. 238, 107 S. Ct. 619, 93 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1986).
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paign Act. "' Specifically, the FEC relied on section 441 (b) of the Act
which bars corporations from using treasury funds to make expendi-
tures in connection with any election to public office.-1 1 2 The Supreme
Court found that even though section 441(b) "does not remove all
opportunities for.., spending by organizations such as the [appellee]
the avenue it leaves open is more burdensome than the one it fore-
closes."' '113 The Court concluded "[t]he fact that the statute's practi-
cal effect may be to discourage protected speech is sufficient to
characterize [it] as an infringement on First Amendment
activities." 1 14
Applying the principles elucidated in the above case to the in-
stant case, the practical effect of FARA is the discouragement of free
speech and is therefore an infringement on first amendment activities.
Yet, the majority in Keene was unwilling to look beyond the statutory
definition of political propaganda, and examine its practical effects.
The practical effects were that Keene did not want to be known as a
disseminator of "political propaganda" so he was precluded from
communicating his own ideas by showing the films. The avenue left
open (not showing the films) was more burdensome than the one it
foreclosed (the ideas expressed in the film not being identified with
foreign filmmakers).
Lamont v. Postmaster General115 is another case in which the
Supreme Court looked past a statutory definition of specific language
in its First Amendment analysis. In Lamont, the statute in question
permitted the postmaster to detain mail classified as "communist
propaganda" and authorized delivery of such mail only upon the ad-
dressee's request. 116 The same "neutral" definition of "political prop-
aganda" in FARA which was at issue in Lamont is at issue in Meese
v. Keene. Yet, in Lamont, the Court found that the need to request
delivery of mail classified as "communist political propaganda" was
almost certain to have a deterrent effect upon first amendment
rights. 1 7 The Court stated that "any addressee is likely to feel some
inhibition in sending for literature which federal officials have con-
111. Id. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1982).
112. Massachusetts Citizens, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 546.
113. Id. at 555.
114. Id.
115. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
116. Id. at 303.
117. Id. at 307.
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demned as 'communist political propaganda'."' 1 8 If, as in Lamont,
the Court in Keene had ventured beyond the statutory definition of
political propaganda and examined the deterrent effect upon debate of
FARA's censorship requirements, it would have found that the same
inhibitions are present for a state senator wishing to exhibit films la-
beled "political propaganda."
As pointed out by Justice Blackmun's dissent in Keene, the
Supreme Court has recognized previously that the actual effect of a
statute may warrant an independent determination of a statute's con-
stitutionality.119 Yet, in Keene, the Court was willing to overlook the
unchallenged testimony of experts testifying as to the connotation of
the word "propaganda."' 20 "Designating something 'political propa-
ganda' is to assert that it communicates hidden or deceitful ideas; that
concealed interests are involved; that unfair or insidious methods or
[sic] being employed; that its dissemination is systematic and organ-
ized in some way."' 21 This is the connotation of the same word the
Supreme Court majority opinion concluded is "content neutral." By
focusing solely on the statutory definition of political propaganda, the
majority ended up overlooking the views of these uncontested experts.
B. Indirect Restrictions On Speech Can Be Violative
The majority also concluded that FARA does not directly bur-
den protected expression since it did not pose any obstacle to Keene's
access to the materials he wished to exhibit.' 22 But the Court has
recognized that indirect discouragements are fully capable of a coer-
cive effect on speech. 23
In Lamont v. Postmaster General,124 the Court stated that "inhi-
bition as well as prohibition against the exercise of precious First
Amendment rights is a power denied to government."' 25 In other
118. Id.
119. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 491 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. Nowhere in the Keene majority opin-
ion is the testimony of the experts discussed.
121. Meese, 481 U.S. at 490 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Declaration of Leonard
W. Doob). See also Seasongood v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 227 F.2d 907, 911 (6th
Cir. 1955) (the term "propaganda" as applied in modem political language connotes selfish or
ulterior purposes and distortion of the facts).
122. 481 U.S. at 473.
123. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950); Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
124. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
125. Id. at 309.
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words, something short of a total prohibition (e.g. indirect discourage-
ment) can amount to an abridgement of speech. In Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan,126 a Rhode Island statute authorized a Commission to
designate morally objectionable material.1 27 The Commission was
empowered to review materials and then notify a distributor that cer-
tain books or magazines had been declared objectionable for sale to
youths under eighteen years of age. 128 Such notices requested the dis-
tributor's "cooperation" and advised that copies of the lists of objec-
tionable publications were given to local police departments and that
it was the Commission's duty to recommend prosecution of purveyors
of obscenity.1 29 Although the Supreme Court held that the Commis-
sion did not regulate or suppress obscenity, the Court still struck
down the statute since, through informal sanctions, the Commission
was able to suppress objectionable materials. 130 The Court pro-
claimed, "[w]e are not the first court to look through forms to the
substance and recognize that informal censorship may sufficiently in-
hibit the circulation of publications to warrant injunctive relief." 131
Thus, the fact that FARA does not directly prohibit or restrain the
exhibition of the three Canadian films does not remove the possibility
that in some informal manner FARA is restraining the freedom of
expression guaranteed by the first amendment. Informal censorship
through the Act's labeling requirements can in and of itself be a viola-
tion of the first amendment.
C. Alternatives to the Label "Political Propaganda"
The majority opinion discussed no alternative remedies or pos-
sibilities. The stated purpose of the Act is the protection of the na-
tional defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United
States.1 32 But, is this purpose only capable of being achieved through
using the label "political propaganda?" Why wouldn't the label "This
film expresses the views of the Canadian Government only" achieve
the same purpose? The label "Made in Canada" would seem to
achieve the same goal. Disclaimers are found at the end of United
States movies and television editorials, yet, the word "propaganda" is
126. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
127. Id. at 59-60.
128. Id. at 58.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 67.
131. Id.
132. Foreign Agents Registration Act, ch. 263, 56 Stat. 248 (1942).
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not needed. If, as the majority of the Supreme Court contends, the
term "political propaganda" is truly content neutral, then replacing it
with one of the above suggestions would avoid the entire dispute. The
Court neither discussed nor contemplated the idea that other "con-
tent neutral" terms could be the solution here.
VII. CONCLUSION
FARA violates the first amendment because of the deterrent ef-
fect caused by labeling a film "political propaganda." This term has a
negative and pejorative connotation and results in the loss of freedom
of speech guaranteed by our Constitution. If the majority of the
Supreme Court had inquired into the true connotation of the term,
instead of limiting itself to only the statutory definition, then they
would have realized that FARA, specifically section 611(j), is abridg-
ing first amendment rights to freedom of speech. The majority also
overlooked the possibility that although FARA may not constitute a
direct restriction of free speech, indirect discouragements are fully ca-
pable of coercive effects on speech, thereby violating the first amend-
ment. Finally, the Court failed to consider any alternatives that
might achieve the same results without the damaging effects of the
term "political propaganda." Simply put, the majority erred in con-
cluding that the term "political propaganda" is "content neutral."
The common perception of this term is anything but neutral, and for
this reason the dissent was correct in concluding that the labeling re-
quirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act are
unconstitutional.
Ari J. Lauer
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